The system of annual conscription, introduced into France by the Loi Jourdan-Delbrel in 1798 1 and maintained, with minor revisions, across the whole period of the Empire, lay at the heart of Napoleon's military strategy, and was the key to his ability to pursue his wars so relentlessly and on so many fronts. Conscription did not necessarily imply the militarization of society or the sublimation of all other policy to the needs of the army; indeed, when compulsory military service was first introduced, the Revolution had gone out of its way to present it as a duty incumbent on the citizen, part of the contract between the individual and the state which citizenship involved. Under the Empire, of course, the link with rights became increasingly diluted, as the long years of war served to acclimatize the country to the conscription process and to give it legitimacy as a tool of modern statehood. So, with the passage of time, as Napoleon extended conscription across the European mainland it became less associated with citizenship and was increasingly seen as a tribute demanded by the victorious French state.
2 For there was no necessary link between a conscript army and the rights of man; that was only one tradition of statehood, the one advanced by French revolutionary discourse. And when, in response to the mass conscript armies which Napoleon put into the field, Prussia too turned to conscription, it is notable that citizenship and military service were linked in a very different way. Here citizenship was not a right, hence the obligation to serve could not derive from that right. Rather, the King of Prussia demanded military service as a duty from his subjects; and in recognition of that service he was pleased to reward them with citizenship.
3 It was a quite different view of the world, though it is doubtful whether those who were subjected to the ballot in the different states of Europe saw the burden that was placed upon them in such conflicting terms.
Jourdan had weighed up the alternative schemes of recruitment in his report to the Directory in Year VI. 4 He firmly believed that conscription must be, and be perceived to be, an equitable system which shared risk and obligation fairly, and insisted that it was no more than the institutionalization 5 It should be able to place an impressive force at the disposal of government to defend the public interest, while continuing to maintain the revolutionary fiction that theirs was an army of citizens who were fighting for the common good-in Jourdan's words 'defenders of the fatherland only and not mercenary satellites that are disposed to oppress the people'. 6 On that basis, he argued, conscription could be enforced without alienating the nation and without driving a wedge between soldiers and civilians, especially since in reality only a small proportion of those who were registered as potential conscripts-those who, on reaching their twentieth birthday, were inscribed on the conscription rolls that were to be drawn up in every department in France-would be called upon to serve. Much of the debate in the Convention, indeed, focused on the small print of the law: which groups should leave for the front first; whether substitutions should be allowed; whether key jobs, in agriculture, administration, or the public services should be reserved. In the event, the 1798 law did insist, uniquely among the conscription laws of the Revolution and Empire, that all must serve and that rich and poor should be equally at the service of the state. This, it was assumed, would make the idea of military service more palatable and would reduce the incidence of desertion, draft evasion and public disorder at home.
In the short term Jourdan's optimism appeared well founded. The fact that there was no provision for replacement in the Directory's law reassured the population and made the measure less contested than it might otherwise have been. The sacred principle of equality appeared to have been upheld, an important consideration for men brought up on revolutionary and republican rhetoric. Indeed, it was the case that the proportion of each age group that would be forced into uniform during the Consulate and Empire varied substantially from year to year in accordance with the army's needs: in 1799, in the initial conscription, the numbers were high to take account of army losses since the last major recruitment in 1793; whereas the generation that came of age in 1801 and 1802, around the time of the Peace of Amiens, could afford to breathe more easily. It might appear, therefore, that the politicians' gamble had paid off and that France had become the first European nation to institute conscription successfully on the back of citizenship, as a material consequence of the human and political rights accorded after 1789. The system initiated by the Directory would, after all, provide Napoleon with hundreds of thousands of soldiers, the bedrock that supported his vaulting imperial ambitions and scattered French armies across three continents, to Egypt and Moscow, Iberia and the Caribbean. The achievement of conscription targets would be one of the principal gauges of loyalty and efficiency in the Consulate and Empire, a yardstick by which mayors, sub-prefects and prefects would be judged by the Napoleonic state.
